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mE SUPREME COURT & CONSTITUTIONAL 
mEORY, 1953-1993. By Ronald Kahn.t Lawrence, KS.: 
University Press of Kansas. 1994. x+ 316 pp. $35.00 
Daniel Krislov2 
In this book, Professor Kahn attempts to explain the deci-
sionmaking processes of the Supreme Court of the United States. 
In doing so, he attempts to discredit what he terms the "instru-
mental" approaches to understanding these processes, and in-
stead postulates that the Court takes a "constitutive approach" in 
its decisionmaking. Unfortunately, Kahn's arguments lack sub-
stance, and therefore fail to convince at least this reader that he 
is on to something. 
Kahn identifies four different "instrumental" approaches. 
The first of these he terms the "election returns" approach. This 
is most strongly identified with political scientist Robert Dahl.3 
This approach views the Court as being a political institution with 
decisionmaking processes "not significantly different" from those 
of the elective branches of government and their appointees. 4 
Justices are, according to Kahn's version of this view, concerned 
with the making of policy choices, and principles of natural and 
fundamental rights do not play a significant role in decisionmak-
ing.s Dahl believes that the Court follows the policymaking pref-
erences of the majority of the electorate, and serves primarily to 
legitimize the majority coalition's interpretation of the Constitu-
tion.6 Views held by the Court that are contrary to those held by 
the majority coalition will, after some lag time, change so as to 
become aligned with the majority while the president, with the 
advice and consent of Congress, alters the Court through the ap-
pointments process.7 In Dahl's view, it is the majority coalition, 
which itself consists of a collection of minority groups, that can 
be the effective guarantor of rights in the American system. Nat-
ural and fundamental rights, precedent, and legal doctrines are 
1. Professor of Politics, Oberlin College. 
2. J.D. Stanford Law School, 1994. Graduate Student, Department of Jurispru-
dence & Social Policy, University of California at Berkeley. 
3. See, e.g., Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Coun 
as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. Pub. Law 279 (1957). 
4. P. 7. 
5. Id. 
6. P. 8. 
7. ld. 
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merely the tools the Court uses in legitimizing the majority coali-
tion's vision of society.s 
The second "instrumental approach" identified by Kahn is 
the "policymaking approach" most strongly associated with polit-
ical scientist Martin Shapiro.9 Like Dahl, Shapiro sees the Court 
as a political policymaking institution, in which the decisions of 
the Court reflect the policy preferences of the Justices rather 
than legal precedent and rules.lo Unlike Dahl, however, Shapiro 
sees the Court as having significant independent policymaking 
ability. Thus, the Court is able to decide whether to embark in 
new policy directions in the absence of strong support or pres-
sure from interest groups or the elective branches of government. 
Shapiro argues that the Court's authority stems from its ability to 
react to diffuse but strong public support for constitutional values 
such as free speech.H 
The third "instrumental approach" is the "safety valve ap-
proach." Adherents of this view, such as Anthony Lewistz and 
Archibald Cox,t3 believe that the Court serves to ensure the 
proper functioning of the pluralist political system. This view ac-
cepts Dahl's view of the equilibrium of the pluralist majority coa-
lition as the protector of individual rights, but also holds that the 
Court has a necessary role in the maintenance of the system-
i.e., that of counteracting the malfunctions of state and federal 
political institutions.14 In this view, the Court and the law must 
be autonomous from the political branches of government. 
The fourth "instrumental approach" is the "biographical ap-
proach."ts This approach views the Justices' decisionmaking 
processes as being determined by their own polity and rights 
principles, and these principles are, in tum, determined by the 
Justices' biographical experiences. Legal debate amongst the 
Justices is not, in this view, the "epiphenomenal" cover for policy 
compromises, but is instead vital to the Justices' decisionmaking 
processes.16 
8. Pp. 7-8. 
9. See, e.g., Martin M. Shapiro, Law and Politics in the Supreme Court: New Ap-
proaches to Political Jurisprudence (Free Press of Glencoe, 1964). 
10. P. 10. 
11. P. 13. 
12. See, e.g., Anthony Lewis, Earl Warren, in Richard H. Sayler, Barry B. Boyer, 
and Robert E. Gooding, Jr., eds., The Warren Court: A Critical Analysis (Chelsea House, 
1969). 
13. See, e.g., Archibald Cox, The Role of the Supreme Court in American Govern-
ment (Oxford U. Press, 1976). 
14. P. 15. 
15. Pp. 15-18. 
16. P. 16. 
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Kahn criticizes these approaches as providing inadequate 
pictures of the decisionmaking processes. He argues that the 
"election returns" approach lacks empirical proofp and that it 
uncritically accepts the outcomes of the pluralist process, failing 
to see that structural inequities may lead to unfairness in the out-
comes of the political process.ts Thus, according to Kahn, seeing 
the Court as being within the political process does not allow it to 
correct these structural inequities. 
Kahn goes on to criticize the policymaking approach as fail-
ing to provide any normative basis for judging the quality of the 
Justice's decisions, as "Shapiro's argument ... leads to the con-
clusion that no constitutional or moral theory is better than any 
other."t9 He also accuses this approach of "trivializing" the role 
of academics and "polity and rights" principles in influencing the 
Justices' decisions.zo As we shall see, much of the remainder of 
this book is a futile attempt to refute Shapiro's view that the Jus-
tices pay significant attention to the academics only when their 
conclusions support the outcome that the Justices prefer. 
The "safety valve" approach is criticized as focusing too nar-
rowly on one value-keeping the pluralist political system 
open.21 Like the election returns and policymaking approaches, 
the safety valve approach uncritically accepts a well-functioning 
pluralist system as a good thing, but it envisions a greater role for 
the Court in maintaining such a system. There is, according to 
Kahn, however, no place for "deep separation of powers, Tenth 
Amendment, Federalist no. 10, Reconstruction amendments, or 
other foundational principles" in this approach.22 Funny, but I 
would have thought that the "right" to an open political process 
was itself a "foundational principle." 
The biographical approach, according to Kahn, recognizes 
the importance of principles in shaping the opinions of the Jus-
tices.23 It does not, however, recognize law as being independent 
of politics, as the life experiences of the judges affect the way in 
which they interpret the principles involved. The judges, in other 
words, are the medium through which the larger culture influ-
ences the interpretation of law.z4 
17. Pp. 53-55. 
18. Pp. 75-76. 
19. P. 96. 
20. Pp. 97-98. 
21. Pp. 77-78. 
22. P. 78. 
23. P. 16. 
24. Pp. 16-18. 
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Kahn believes that the fault that all of these approaches 
share is their failure to recognize the rule of law as autonomous 
from politics. He believes that there is a need for a new model 
that recognizes this. Thus, Kahn proposes a "constitutive ap-
proach" in which the Justices' views on "polity and rights" princi-
ples interact with the views presented by the "interpretive 
community."25 Polity principles are those that are concerned 
with the proper role of the Court and other institutions in the 
American constitutional order ,26 while rights principles concern 
the fundamental rights that should be afforded individuals and, 
perhaps, groups.27 The interpretive community consists of aca-
demic commentators, law professors, political theorists, and 
political scientists who write about the work of the courts.28 
Thus, these principles are more important than policy concerns, 
and the interpretive community is more important than political 
actors in shaping the actions of the Court. 
Kahn offers no strong evidence for the primacy of rights and 
polity principles. Rather, he simply asserts the mention of these 
principles in a particular opinion indicates that this was the factor 
that determined the case (a ploy he uses several times through-
out the book). Unfortunately, this does not demonstrate any-
thing of the kind. Shapiro and the other "policymaking" 
theorists do not assert that rights and polity principles play no 
role in the Court's opinions, but rather that they are used to jus-
tify the policy decisions at which the Court arrives. Kahn makes 
no serious attempt to explain how he can empirically demon-
strate the "true" motivations of the Court, but that does not stop 
him from making assertions about what that motivation is. 
Much of Kahn's book is dedicated to demonstrating how the 
constitutive approach helps to understand the difference between 
the Warren and Burger Courts. He argues that the major differ-
ence between the Courts was in their responses to the interpre-
tive community.z9 The Warren Court, according to Kahn, 
rejected the complacent polity views of the pluralists such as 
Dahl and instead adopted a "critical pluralist" view, which per-
ceived a need for greater amounts of judicial intervention to pre-
vent groups of people, especially blacks and urbanites, from 
being locked out of the political system (this belief was behind 
the voting and districting cases, as well as the educational deseg-
25. Pp. 18-22. 
26. Pp. 20-21. 
27. Pp. 21-22. 
28. P. 206. 
29. Pp. 179-81. 
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regation cases).30 The Burger Court, on the other hand, accepted 
much of the analysis of its contemporary interpretive community, 
and its decisions reflected a different view of polity and rights 
principles than did that of the Warren Court. The Burger Court 
was, according to Kahn, more likely to view rights and polity is-
sues as being embedded in institutional and societal contexts 
than was the Warren Court, hence the greater focus on affirma-
tive action and institutional reform by the Burger Court. Thus, 
Kahn argues, the "no counterrevolution" view of the Burger 
Court, which sees it as an aimless transitional Court,3t is funda-
mentally wrong. Rather, the Burger Court was responding to its 
own vision of the proper constitutional order.32 
I find this argument quite thin. Kahn attempts to prove that 
the role of the swing Justices has been overstated in the litera-
ture, and that this has led to a view that the decisions of the Bur-
ger Court were generally unprincipled compromises. He 
provides statistics on the religious education cases heard by the 
Burger Court in order to prove his assertion, but as far as I can 
see, all he succeeds in demonstrating is the pivotal role of Justice 
Powell, who was in the majority in all but one of the cases.33 Jus-
tice Powell's pivotal role in the affirmative action cases is also 
dramatically illustrated by his opinion of the Court in Regents of 
the University of California v. Bakke,34 which received the votes 
of the four conservative Justices for the result and the votes of 
the four liberal Justices for much of the reasoning. Kahn identi-
fies affirmative action as being at the heart of the Burger Court's 
constitutive concerns, and Bakke is clearly the most important 
decision handed down by that Court on this issue, yet to argue 
that the Bakke result is even coherent seems a daunting intellec-
tual task. Nothing in Kahn's book persuades me to believe that 
there is any better way of viewing the Burger Court than as a 
policymaking entity with two fundamentally opposed voting 
blocs, and a center attempting to build compromises. 
Likewise, if one analyzes where the Rehnquist Court has re-
versed the direction of the Warren and Burger Court precedents, 
one finds strong support for the view that the Court is politically 
responsive. The Court has for example, not entirely overruled 
30. Pp. 65-66. 
31. Vincent Blasi, ed., The Burger Court: The Counter-Revolution That Wasn't (Yale 
U. Press, 1983). 
32. P. 138. 
33. P. 117. 
34. 438 u.s. 265 (1978). 
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the holding of Roe v. Wade,Js but only modified it somewhat. 
Kahn holds this out as an instance of the Court resisting the pres-
sures of the executive branch because of the Court's view of its 
own role in the polity as a protector or rights, and of the impor-
tance of precedent as a necessary component of institutional in-
tegrity.36 There are at least two major reasons to doubt this view. 
First, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. 
Casey37 was handed down during a presidential election cam-
paign in which abortion was a key issue, and the Republican vot-
ers were deeply divided over the issue. (Republicans and 
Republican-leaning voters were closely divided on the issue of 
abortion during the summer of 1992, with 49% supporting and 
42% opposed to President Bush's position that abortion should 
be legal only in cases of rape, incest, and when the pregnancy 
endangered the woman's life.)Js The last thing the Bush reelec-
tion campaign would have wanted that year was a decisive opin-
ion overturning Roe, as they were trying to defuse the issue.39 
The Casey decision actually closely paralleled public opinion on 
the issue, which favored abortion rights with restrictions. 40 Thus, 
Casey can easily be viewed as a political compromise. Secondly, 
although the plurality opinion goes out of its way to stress the 
importance of stare decisis, the decision actually overturns the tri-
35. 410 u.s. 113 (1973). 
36. Pp. 256-57. 
37. - U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). 
38. Larry Hugick, 1992 Presidential Campaign: August, Gallup Poll Monthly, August 
1992, at 2, 6. 
39. Although the 1992 Republican Platform called for a constitutional amendment 
banning abortion, the Bush campaign backed away from this position. See, e.g., The Pres-
ident's Measures to Strengthen Families, Bush Campaign Document, August 15, 1992 
(available on the internet-gopher tamuts.tamu.edu). 
40. A survey by the Gallup Organization taken January 16-19, 1992 showed that 
respondents overwhelmingly supported three of the provisions upheld by the Casey deci-
sion; 86% favored requirements that a doctor inform patients of alternatives to abortion, 
73% favored a 24-hour waiting period before receiving an abortion, and 70% favored a 
requirement of parental consent for women under 18. However, 73% also favored are-
quirement that the husband of a married woman must be notified if she decides to have 
an abortion-a requirement that was struck down by the Casey decision. Public Opinion 
and Demographic Report, American Enterprise, May/June 1992, at 97, 100. Kahn might 
argue that this demonstrates that fealty to equal protection precedent rather than public 
opinion was driving the Court's decision on this issue. On the other hand, the Court did 
not seem terribly concerned with equal protection when it allowed the requirement for a 
24-hour waiting period for a medical procedure that by definition can only be performed 
on women. I am not aware of any similar requirement for any other medical procedure in 
American law. Since the Court's concern with equal protection seems rather selective, it 
thus seems more plausible to argue that the three Justices who joined the plurality opin-
ion were concerned with the practical implications of the spousal notification require-
ment, particularly the potential physical harm that might occur to some women in this 
situation. 
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mester framework of Roe, and also overturns subsequent deci-
sions that invalidated restrictions on obtaining abortions (such as 
the imposition of a 24-hour waiting period).4t This sounds more 
like the acts of a Court trying to justify policy switches rather 
than one actually concerned with polity principles. 
Kahn's view of the Court's decisionmaking processes seems 
something of an academic insider's perspective, overstating the 
importance of academics to the process. Certainly, there are rea-
sons to believe that academics do have some influence on the 
actions of the Court, particularly in areas that are technical and 
command little or no political attention. However, it is hard to 
believe that the Justices would listen to someone whose constitu-
tional theories led to conclusions that were opposed to their pol-
icy preferences. Likewise, it seems naive to assume that the 
academics are also somehow immune to political considerations. 
Their policy preferences and the subjects they choose to write 
about are also shaped by the culture in which they live. It is very 
hard to believe that there are many academics out there forming 
theories of constitutional law that lead to conclusions to which 
they are personally opposed. In any event, Kahn's description of 
the Warren Court's rejection of the interpretive community's 
view of pluralism renders his view that the role of the interpre-
tive community is pivotal incoherent. This history, if accurate, 
demonstrates that the Court is free to accept or reject the inter-
pretive community's analyses, and the Court can develop its own. 
Indeed, Kahn argues that the current Court will probably reject 
the theories developed by the currently fashionable civic republi-
can theorists because their writings fail to provide a rationale for 
the Court to maintain a role of imposing a critical vision of the 
Constitution.4z The question ultimately left open is what actually 
affects the Justices' visions of the proper constitutional order. 
The answer that Kahn offers is that "the Court makes its choices 
[over polity principles and fundamental rights issues] in relation-
ship to the boundaries of the debate within the interpretive com-
munity and the wider, informed society," and is "autonomous of 
the direct influence of electoral politics and the interpretive com-
munity."43 How does Kahn know this, and where do Justices' 
choices come from? Readers of this book will have no idea. 
41. The Casey decision also overturned aspects of Akron v. Akron Center for Repro-
ductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983), and Thornburgh v. American College of Obste-
tricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986). 
42. P. 265. 
43. Pp. 262-63. 
